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This article attends to the connections between neo-liberal 
and neo-developmentalist labour regimes, asylum and 
immigration management, and the exploitation of undocu-
mented, refugee, and migrant women, based on the experi-
ences of Syrian refugee women in Turkey. The concept of 
precarity is explored as a selectively applied strategy by 
states to people who lack “status” or who are unable to 
benefit from “membership rights.” Forced migrants, illegal 
migrants, and asylum seekers are directly implicated in 
highly precarious work experiences at the bottom end of 
labour markets across the Global South, becoming trapped 
in forced labour and human trafficking arrangements. The 
article establishes a link between extreme forms of migrant 
labour exploitation in precarious life worlds and gender-
based profiling of life chances. 
Résumé
Cet article concerne les connexions entre les régimes de 
travail néo-libéraux et néo-développementistes, la gestion 
de l’asile et de l’immigration, et l’exploitation de femmes 
migrantes, réfugiées, sans papiers, à partir du vécu de 
réfugiées syriennes en Turquie. Le concept de précarité est 
exploré en tant que stratégie appliquée de manière sélective 
par les états aux personnes qui n’ont « pas de statut » ou 
ne peuvent pas bénéficier de « droits d’appartenance ». Les 
migrants forcés, les migrants illégaux et les demandeurs 
d’asile sont directement concernés par des expériences de 
travail fortement précaire au plus bas des marchés du tra-
vail sur l’ensemble des pays du Sud, et deviennent alors pris-
onnier du travail forcé et du trafic d’êtres humains. L’article 
établit un lien entre des formes extrêmes d’exploitation des 
migrants au travail dans des contextes de vie précaires et un 
profilage des opportunités de vie en fonction du genre.
Introduction
In 2003 the concept of precarity emerged as the central organizing platform for a series of social struggles that would spread across Europe.1 However, to understand 
precarity as a political concept rather than simply as a form of 
labour exploitation, it is necessary to go beyond economistic 
approaches that see social-political conditions of populations 
subjected to this form of structural violence.2 Such a move in 
effect requires us to see precarity as the norm and regularized 
labour as the exception. This conceptual move enables us to 
frame the precarity of labour, in particular migrant labour, in 
a broader historical and geographical perspective, shedding 
light on its relation to the phenomena of precarious lives. In 
this regard, novel forms of subjectivization observed during 
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and after processes of dispossession effected by forced migra-
tion are themselves inherently precarious, often trans-border 
undertakings targeting migrants, stateless people, and sans-
papiers.3 As argued by Rygiel,4 our current understanding of 
precarity is insufficient to describe the specific challenges of 
non-citizen and undocumented lives. We need a shift of lens, 
and far from being focused on the way precarity manifests 
itself in the workplace, we must concentrate on the chal-
lenges posed by residence and legal status, or lack thereof, 
for migrants and refugees. The nebulous class quality of the 
concept would then come to benefit such a reframing. With 
the exponential growth of civil war in Syria since 2011, the 
refugee crisis in the Middle East has escalated sharply, and 
its impact is widening from neighbouring countries towards 
Europe. This article describes the emergence of a special kind 
of labour market in sectors that are often designated as infor-
mal, marginal, and worse, as non-labour for Syrian women 
migrants and refugees scattered across the Middle East since 
2011.5
Indeed, there has been precious little attention paid to 
the quality of work life with which such precarious liveli-
hoods are associated. This article considers several features 
of Syrian migrants’ and refugees’ work lives that are dispro-
portionately oppressive. In particular, I propose that we use 
“gender” as a constitutive category to understand experiences 
of Syrian forced migrants in the Middle East. In addition to 
definitive elements of precarious or non-standard employ-
ment, Syrian women experience life-changing events that are 
largely invisible: early forced marriages, human trafficking 
to prostitution, and becoming second/clandestine wives to 
local men in the host society.6 While different tracks of sur-
vival that affect both Syrian men and women have existential 
conditions in common, there isn’t enough commonality to 
forge a genderless depiction of Syrian refugees and migrants’ 
absorption to precarity.7 
In the following pages I first chart the engagement of 
Middle Eastern states with the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis 
and contextualize the response of the Turkish state to the 
exodus as the main recipient of the displaced Syrians accord-
ingly.8 The purpose of this exercise is to understand why 
the outbreak of the region’s largest refugee  crisis since the 
Second World War, exceeding even the Palestinian one, did 
not prompt the neighbouring states to accede to standard, 
restrictive renditions of international refugee law or border 
closures.9 Reception of Syrian refugees in contemporary 
Turkey is the latest example of the collapse of border protec-
tion fantasies so strongly embraced in the Global North.10 
The Syrian exodus indicates the amalgamation of forced 
migration flows with emergent forms of developmentalism 
in the region, with marked gender-based subjectification 
of non-status people.11  In this regard, the article will first 
discuss the generic meaning of precarious labour and then 
apply it to the forced migration context. It will then highlight 
key areas of gender-specific forms of subjugation affecting 
Syrian refugee and migrant women in order to identify the 
gaps in the literature on precarity in the Middle East. 
This article contributes a detailed exploration of the spe-
cific pathways through which socio-legal status (i.e., “asylum 
seeker,” “refused asylum seeker,” “temporary residence,” 
“guest-worker,” etc.) and gender identity are combined to 
shape experiences of forced labour and the conditions lead-
ing to exploitative work. It also reconsiders different mean-
ings and interpretations of forced labour vis-à-vis forced 
migration.12 Here the concept of precarity denoting lived 
experiences characterized by uncertainty and instability is 
used to help understand the key factors and processes that 
render Syrian refugees and migrants more vulnerable to both 
forced labour and lives marked by indignities. 
Gender, Asylum, and Precarity in the Middle East
The topic of forced labour is receiving growing political and 
policy attention across the globe. Regardless of the specific 
national and regional context, compromised socio-legal 
status of immigrants and refugees resulting from restrictive 
immigration policy, neo-liberal labour market regulations 
and migrants’ own trajectories normalize precarious work. 
In this context, using precarity as a lens to examine forced 
labour encourages the recognition of extreme forms of 
exploitation as part of a wider picture of systematic exploita-
tion of migrants in the global labour market. The concept 
of hyper-precarity is then used to explain how multidimen-
sional insecurities contribute to forced labour experiences. 
Before discussing hyper-precarity in detail, however, it is 
important to revisit the concept of precarity itself. In addi-
tion to the rich literature on labour precarity, Judith Butler’s 
work on precarious life is worthy of particular mention in 
this context.13 Underlining the inherent vulnerability of the 
individual in late-capitalist societies, Butler takes the bold 
step of considering all human life precarious. Precarious-
ness in this sense implies our dependency upon others and 
the full exposure of bonds between individuals. All human 
existence is interdependent and thus precarity invites us to 
rethink our responsibility concerning the lives of others. In 
the context of political cultures in post-9/11 America, Butler 
then submits that enhancing the precariousness of some at 
the expense of others has become the defining feature of new 
frames of war in the age of presumed global terrorism. The 
resultant experience of enhanced precariousness created by 
the select operations of power, such as those generated by 
prevailing discourse in post-9/11 America, is what Butler 
calls “precarity.” In this way, she purports that encounters 
with precariousness and precarity hold new potential to 
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engender alternative ethical responses to crises of our times. 
In the specific context of this article, Butler’s concept of 
precarity allows us to think about the relationship between 
different forms of precarity that frame refugee reception 
regimes in the Middle East and in the daily lives of Syrian 
refugee women amidst contemporary Turkish society. 
In this larger context, hyper-precarity in labour results 
from forms of recruitment that cover both forced and 
deceptive employment, leading to specifically gender-based 
instances of precarious livelihoods.14 For instance, in daily 
practices, either several constraints are applied to force peo-
ple to work for a particular employer against their will, or a 
person is recruited using false promises about the nature of 
the work, location, wages, etc. Legally speaking, work and 
life under duress leads to adverse working and living situa-
tions imposed on a person by the use of force, threat, penalty, 
or menace of penalty, and often a combination of several of 
these means of extortion. These types of labour arrangement 
may also entail an excessive volume of work, tasks that are 
beyond what can reasonably be expected to be completed, 
degrading living and working conditions, limitations on 
freedom of movement, denial of basic amenities and needs, 
bonded labour arrangements, and other forms of excessive 
dependency on the employer. The difficulty faced when leav-
ing one’s employer is characteristic of forced labour when 
leaving entails a penalty or high risk to the worker. Penalty 
or its threat may be applied directly to the worker or to fam-
ily members. This can be experienced as coercive and even 
carried out via threats and violence that could be physical, 
sexual, or psychological. This includes restriction of work-
ers’ freedom of movement due to isolation, confinement, or 
surveillance, debt bondage or debt manipulation and any 
accompanying threats against a worker or family members. 
Withholding of wages or other promised benefits to retain a 
worker longer than agreed are also commonly used strategies 
to sustain the submission of workers to forced labour. Reten-
tion of passports, identity papers, work permits, or travel 
documents also refers to situations where workers are forced 
into bonded labour. If an employer confiscates documents 
upon the worker’s arrival and refuses to return them, this 
effectively prevents the worker from leaving. Denunciation 
threats are used, especially in the case of irregular migrant 
workers, asylum seekers, and sans-papiers. The experiences 
of Syrian female migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in 
the Middle East fall within this category.15 Although this 
group has not generally been recognized as at risk of being 
coerced into forced work, in the following pages I will make 
a case to the contrary. 
In many cases, asylum seekers in the Middle East are 
denied permission to work, and they therefore have to sur-
vive under highly constrained access to both work and social 
security.16 Henceforth, individuals often feel compelled to 
seek alternative means of income, often found in informal 
and unregulated sectors of the economy that shield unscru-
pulous employers. A growing body of research, albeit con-
ducted under very difficult and curtailed circumstances due 
to the political climate in host societies, demonstrates that 
thousands of refugees, forced migrants, and asylum seek-
ers remain in the Middle East with limited access to work, 
access to education, or recourse to public funds. Pushed into 
the informal economy to meet their basic needs, these vul-
nerable populations, and in particular women, become par-
ticularly susceptible to exploitation, including forced labour 
practices and human trafficking. 
With reference to Syrian forced migrant women who 
receive leave to remain in Middle Eastern countries (includ-
ing legal status, humanitarian protection and discretionary 
leave, or other interim solutions), these populations are 
theoretically able to find employment and access benefits 
and social services. When they are employed, the kind of 
work Syrian refugee women and girls undertake is typically 
insecure, temporary, and poorly paid with long and irregular 
working hours, and unfair dismissals are all too common.17 
While aggregate data are not yet available, preliminary 
research conducted by NGOs and public media interviews 
reveal that Syrian refugee women have begun to cluster in 
particular sectors—such as cleaning, care, agriculture, food 
processing, piecemeal cottage industries, hospitality, and sex 
work—all of which are open to exploitation and insecure. 
This signals an area of research in need of development.
There are at least three dimensions of precarity that sepa-
rate this type of work from other forms of labour: non-stand-
ard forms of work, wider insecurity, and undocumented and 
supra-legal practices of labour exploitation.18 Ultimately, 
deregulation and erosion of workers’ rights coupled with 
restrictive welfare and immigration regimes create an envi-
ronment that allows workplace abuses to flourish.19 In this 
larger context, the potent combination of socio-legal status 
and gender of an individual determines her rights and enti-
tlements to work, welfare, and residency, conditioning her 
entry to the labour market entry, shaping her wider social 
life chances. In turn, this situation foregrounds a differenti-
ated array of rights and protections for different groups of 
migrants with a marked gender dimension. For instance, 
Alpak et al. demonstrate the differential distribution of life 
chances and survival.20 In their cross-sectional study in a 
tent city in Turkey, they concluded that the probability of 
having post-traumatic stress disorder among Syrian refu-
gees in our sample was 71 per cent, if they had the following 
features: female; diagnosed with psychiatric disorder; fam-
ily history of psychiatric disorder; and experience of two or 
more traumas. 
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A Refugee, a Migrant, a Guest, an Illegal Resident, 
or a New Citizen? The Naming Rituals of 
Displacement in the Middle East
Although precarity has become a global phenomenon shap-
ing labour markets in both the Global North and South, a 
nuanced analysis of the specific national and regional context 
within which it unfolds is still needed.21 Here our context is 
determined by contemporary Middle Eastern states. Examples 
of the new Middle Eastern state failing to provide its citizens 
with basic public services in the context of neo-liberal eco-
nomic restructuring are as common as the counter examples 
of the general populace being endowed with massive road 
construction and urban renewal projects, dams and mines, 
nuclear power stations and state-of-the-art locally produced 
weaponry.22 Approval for and appreciation of the power of 
the Middle Eastern state by the masses is as widely chanted 
as narratives of discontent concerned about privatized infra-
structural development projects, marginalized populations, 
dispossession, and chronic poverty.23 In this sense, categori-
cal reliance on neo-liberalism to understand contemporary 
Middle Eastern states obscures more than it reveals. Instead, 
attention needs to be paid to specific techniques of govern-
ance and relations of power that shape both the discourse and 
practice of citizenship/rights and membership in contempo-
rary Middle Eastern polities. This, I believe, is best achieved 
by an engagement with debates on developmentalist/neo-
developmentalist state theory applied to the region.
Lineages of the developmentalist state in the Middle East 
reach back to the days of independence from colonial and/
or imperial rule during the 1950s.24 Its conservative version 
emphasized growth, provision of social welfare, and building 
up allegiance to the state through corporatist policies. Con-
fronting the liberal emphasis on state-market alliances, the 
region also witnessed the emergence of a divergent, socialist 
form of developmentalism with a strong purchase amongst 
the Arab nationalist cadres during the 1970s.25 Both on the 
conservative and progressive sides of the spectrum, the for-
mula of a “strong, self-sufficient state” and centralization of 
governance were the key characteristic of developmentalism. 
Consequently, the post-independence states in the Middle 
East, though they brought hopes for inclusive policies and 
increased rapport between state and society, delivered a 
heavy and centralized administrative apparatus.26 There is 
little doubt about the strength of contemporary Middle East-
ern states in their capacity to coerce, either. 
The “old” developmentalist model, also known as national 
developmentalism, was first established in the Middle East 
back in the 1960s and had a distinct militaristic flavour.27 
Defenders of national developmentalism considered the 
state as the main agent of social transformation. The new 
developmentalism continues along these lines, except what 
is currently considered to be the desired social transforma-
tion adheres to a different set of rules and criteria with a 
distinct emphasis on the absorption of the dispossessed. The 
model embraced by the Middle Eastern developmentalist 
state in its latest stage encourages creation of new classes 
and categories of belonging to ensure a reliable, loyal, obedi-
ent public. In particular, instrumentalization of citizenship 
and membership rights as a means for political leveraging, 
along with widespread clientelism among the economic elite, 
led to a unique relationship between different political and 
economic actors and the state.28 
Similarities and continuities in citizenship regimes of sev-
eral Middle Eastern developmentalist states briefly discussed 
here reveal that there is indeed a persistent inner logic to the 
reception of dispossessed groups from neighbouring states. 
This distinct approach is one of complementarity, with rein-
forced regulatory capacities of the state to decide not only 
who to let in, but also how and where to situate them once 
they arrive in accordance with the matrix of labour market 
needs and contingencies of the political landscape. What is 
most noteworthy in the example of the reception of the Syrian 
war victims and refugees is the explicit refusal of immediate 
interventionist or protectionist moves by the neighbouring 
states concerning the flow of masses through their borders. 
Only well past the zenith of the Syrian crisis did Lebanon, Jor-
dan, and Turkey begin to exercise traditional border controls. 
In this sense, the latest version of the developmentalist state in 
the Middle East is proven to be pragmatic and highly adaptive 
to changing regional circumstances. It desires both a strong 
market and a strong state and doesn’t see any contradiction 
between the two. On the contrary, to absorb the dichotomies 
created by this anathema of progress and justice delivered 
by the state and yet through the market, the Middle Eastern 
states’ redistributive goals now include opening up of citizen-
ship and the “right to work” to the dispossessed of the region. 
Contrary to orientalist takes on migration management in the 
Middle East, opening borders at times of regional crisis and 
managing their porousness in an ad hoc fashion is an affirma-
tion of a protagonist “strong state” rather than a weak one. 
After intermittent periods of limited democratic rule, the 
strong states of the Middle East often became quasi-authori-
tarian regimes.29 Installation of industrial capitalism and the 
organization of society along corporate lines, coupled with 
the select delivery of social rights and yet the denial of work-
ing classes as legitimate political interlocutors coincided with 
the beginnings of populism in the region.30 Almost eighty 
years since the emergence of the state system in the Middle 
East, the current discourse of developmentalism seems to be 
working on the same set of fundamental assumptions con-
cerning state-society relations, yet under a new cloak: the 
strong state is now presented as the nation itself, as the par 
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excellence instrument of the collective desires and dreams 
for Middle Eastern societies to take their place among the 
powerful nations on the world stage. Absorption of the 
regionally dispossessed thus also displays grandeur and 
might as well as harbouring the possibility of renegotiated 
borders or new infrastructural investment opportunities. 
Across the region, the reduction of membership and citi-
zenship rights to the ballot box is linked with the presenta-
tion of the state as an almighty, self-sufficient entity, single-
handedly dictating the political imagination of a future.31 
Given their distributive commitments and capitalizing on 
their social policies and basic public service provisions, the 
gradual closure of decision-making to the public in these 
aggrandized states was further fortified via their reliance on 
old paternalistic alliances with the middle classes. Strong 
charismatic leaders have strengthened their legitimacy in 
this increasingly self-contained state.32 Attempts to formu-
late national identities from above include instances where 
the state—and not society—defines the “nation” and the 
public included the citation of the migrant, the precarious 
worker, the urban refugee, and the “guests” amongst the 
grand tally of signs and wonders of national and regional 
eminence. The new Middle Eastern states’ tendency to 
replace their original emancipatory or redistributive politi-
cal projects with “power projects” has become all the more 
visible in the present management of forced migrations and 
strategic absorption of dispossessed populations.33 Holding 
state power means that newly built alliances and concessions 
regarding extending rights to new groups may well become 
the order of the day for serving governments and leading 
parties. This unique amalgamation of neo-liberal obsession 
with endless accumulation and statist conception of politics 
ushered in unprecedented changes in the management of 
migration and citizenship in the Middle East. Expelling those 
who are deemed unwanted while accepting the unwanted of 
others is slowly and silently becoming a tool for sustaining 
the wave of neo-developmentalism across the region. 
The Curious Case of Turkey
The most commonly cited country in the list of recipient 
states of Syrian migrants and refugees in the Middle East is 
Turkey. Turkey is a signatory to the Refugee Convention but 
with a serious exception clause and entertains a unique status 
determination regime. From the 1920s into the mid-1990s, 
the Turkish Republic received more than one and a half mil-
lion Muslim refugees, ranging from Albanians to Tatars, and 
their integration was undertaken on an ad hoc basis. During 
the 1990s an influx of more than 300,000 Pomaks and ethnic 
Turks fleeing the persecution of the then-Communist regime 
in Bulgaria were also quickly absorbed within the immigra-
tion and citizenship policy framework.34 The government, in 
line with a law from 1934, considered the latter group to be of 
“Turkish descent and culture” and granted them the possibil-
ity of acquiring Turkish citizenship. In 1991, however, Turkey 
became the receiving country of the mass influx of refugees 
who could not be included in that particular law. Close to 
half a million people fled Saddam Hussein’s violence against 
Kurds and other minorities in northern harsh mountainous 
terrain and winter conditions, and at a time when the Turk-
ish state still denied cultural and language rights of Kurds 
within its borders. In what was initially seen as a national 
security crisis, Turkey tried to deny entry to the displaced. 
Eventually the government mounted a diplomatic effort, 
which led the United Nations Security Council to create a 
safe zone in northern Iraq that would ensure the return of 
refugees to their homes. Together with the crisis of 1988 that 
emerged with the arrival of more than 60,000 Kurds fleeing 
the Halabja massacres, temporarily housed in southeastern 
Turkey, the “Kurdish refugee problem” was thus the defin-
ing moment in modern Turkey’s handling of mass influx of 
the displaced in the region. In November 1994 Turkey pro-
ceeded to adopt its first national legislation on asylum. The 
resultant regulation defined the urgency to respond to mass 
influxes of refugees before the displaced populations could 
cross the border into Turkey unless the government was to 
make a decision to the contrary, as was the case with the Syr-
ians some twenty years later.35 With the arrival of Syrians, 
Turkey has become the sixth-largest recipient of refugees in 
the world. However, its immigration system is under severe 
strain, and the status determination process conducted by 
the UNHCR could take years. To alleviate the problem in the 
context of the Syrian exodus, UNHCR began to employ the 
services of a Turkish non-governmental organization, Asso-
ciation of Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants since 
July 2013 to speed up the process.36 The Turkish General 
Directorate of Migration Management then implemented 
the Foreigners and International Protection Law that came 
into force in April 2014. This new law redefines the rights 
that asylum seekers and recognized refugees would enjoy 
in access to public services and employment.37 When these 
policy measures were in place, management of Syrian refu-
gees entered a new phase.38 
Despite its historical reticence to formally integrate the 
displaced arriving from the region, by the end of 2011 the 
Turkish government had thrown its weight completely 
behind the Syrian opposition and recognized the then-Syrian 
National Council as the representative of the Syrian people. 
Turkey’s expectation, which was in line with a good part of 
the international community at the time, was that the Assad 
regime would not last long. Against this background, Turkey 
declared in October 2011 an open door policy towards refu-
gees fleeing Syria and developed a legal framework that came 
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to be known as “temporary protection.” However, things did 
not go entirely according to plan, and by May 2014 there 
were 220,000 Syrian refugees housed in twenty-two camps 
along the Syrian border with another 515,000 registered as 
urban refugees.39 As of early 2018, 3.9 million Syrians were 
estimated to have sought refuge in Turkey.40 The persistence 
of the conflict well into 2018 and the ever-growing number 
of urban refugees has created serious challenges for Turkey. 
Across the region, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
Syrian war victims and refugees are not about to return 
home. This brought up major policy issues for the Turkish 
government,41 including whether the government should 
offer Syrian refugees and migrants residency and citizenship 
rights and questions addressing urgent education, employ-
ment, health, shelter, and integration needs.42 The presence 
of growing numbers of Syrians in Turkey is having a direct 
impact on host communities economically, socially, and 
politically. Where Syrians work, how they work, where 
they live, and for whom they would vote are questions with 
increasing import, as they now constitute a sizable 5 per cent 
minority in Turkey.
As much as Turkey’s open door policy has been commend-
able, it has had a weak legal basis and thus a prominently ad 
hoc quality,43 despite the establishment of a new directorate 
for management of migration, including forced migration 
flows.44 The legal framework encompassing these new policy 
initiatives was heavily influenced by the EU directives in place. 
However, it was adapted to the short- and long-terms goals 
of the Turkish state. In particular, the regulation adopted in 
March 2012 that allowed Syrians to stay indefinitely could 
not be regarded as constituting the basis of a comprehen-
sive policy extending universal protection for more than 
three million people.45 It is a carefully calculated move for 
partial and selective absorption of the Syrians in Turkey.46 
More than 800,000 Syrians registered in Turkey have now 
been protected under a temporary protection regime, being 
addressed as “guests” or “temporary protection beneficiaries” 
by the Turkish authorities. Implementation of the temporary 
protection policy for Syrians means that Syrians are neither 
refugees nor asylum seekers under Turkish domestic law. 
In 2013 Turkey adopted its first law that regulates asylum, 
namely the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 
which entered into force in April 2014. Although it promises 
better protection standards and more safeguards for asylum 
seekers and refugees, the current legal protection regime of 
Syrians in Turkey is blind to precarity because it needs to 
be addressed not by citizenship and immigration regulations 
but the overall labour regime and under the aegis of admin-
istrative law.47
It is important to remember, however, that Turkey is not 
the only country affected by the sheer mass of the Syrian 
exodus and responding to the regional circumstances in an 
official capacity. Overall, policy restrictions on residency 
renewals affect the enjoyment of basic rights and freedom for 
refugees of all nationalities in the region. Access to territory, 
UNHCR registration, and maintaining livelihoods including 
formal right to work remain the main challenges faced by 
Syrian refugees and the waves of dispossessed that were dis-
located before them. 
The Invisible “Guests”: Syrian Women’s Precarious 
Lives on the Move
Turkey is home to the highest refugee population in the 
Middle East, with the exception of Israel, having adopted an 
open door policy for people who come from Syria from 2011 
onwards. By December 2016 the number of registered Syr-
ians in Turkey reached 2,783,617 according to the Ministry 
of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management. 
Of these, 1,301,026 were Syrian women. The numbers as we 
neared the winter of 2017 were expected to be well in excess 
of three million Syrians being settled in Turkey, the majority 
of whom were women and girls. 
The number of displaced Syrians crossing the border into 
Turkey has dramatically risen with the escalating use of vio-
lence employed by the Syrian regime to suppress the revolt. 
With the influx of huge numbers of Syrians into Turkey, 
however, anti-immigrant, anti-Arab discourses have surfaced 
among the Turkish public. Furthermore, due to the Turkish 
government’s openly hostile position to the Syrian regime, 
Syrian migration became closely linked with Turkish domes-
tic politics and foreign policy. Analyzing the Syrian migrant 
community in Turkey requires contextualizing it within the 
political framework of both the host society and the region. 
The literature on security and securitization has long 
been criticized for neglecting the significance of gender as 
a dimension of security. Literature on security within the 
international relations discipline has been inadequately 
engaged in analyzing the pervasive insecurities affecting 
women during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts. 
Instead the prevalent discourse often imitates statist dis-
courses on armed conflict. In contradistinction, an exami-
nation of gender-related human (in)security issues arising 
as a result of the armed conflicts would significantly enrich 
the literature. This change of perspective is critical to under-
standing the gender-specific social, economic, and cultural 
barriers that create insecurities for Syrian women refugees 
and migrants.48
While all Syrians have been affected by violence and con-
flict in Syria and their lives hasve been uprooted, the group 
most affected by the ongoing war are women and children.49 
Prior to war and conflict, women and children were already 
regarded as a disadvantaged group in modern Syria. The war 
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has added new forms of precariousness and insecurity to 
their lives. However, the extremes of either “happiness” for 
being saved or “poverty” as an endemic condition of their 
new lives do not reveal much about the future for Syrian 
refugee and migrant women.
In general, Syrian women face more gender-related prob-
lems than Turkish women when attempting to participate in 
economic, political, and social life as a result of their precari-
ous status. Despite their disadvantages, many Syrian refugee 
and migrant women have become leaders for their families 
and have come into prominence as significant actors in the 
shaping of the economic and social life of Syrian communities 
in Turkey. Syrian women constitute almost half of the Syrian 
refugee population in Turkey, and the five-to-eighteen and 
nineteen-to-thirty-four age groups constitute the majority of 
Syrian women settled in the country. The youngest age group, 
those less than five years old, includes close to quarter of a mil-
lion girls. This indicates that the fertility of Syrian women has 
remained higher than the Turkish or regional average, despite 
the problems such as living in a foreign country, having an 
unstable life, and an uncertain future. Consequently, educa-
tion, care, and health policies, including the services to be 
provided for the under-five age group, have become a major 
concern in a country where the population at large already 
strives to receive adequate services in these key areas.50 
In making policies to address the issues facing them, the 
Turkish authorities are keen to give priority to the traditions, 
culture, and habits of Syrian women. Many of these tradi-
tions, however, are markedly patriarchal and tend to treat 
women as brides and mothers only, thus limiting their liveli-
hoods to household labour and marriage. A basic mistake 
made in policy development is the assumption that Syrian 
women have the same needs and vulnerabilities as women in 
Turkish society, since both groups are predominantly Mus-
lim, and they come from neighbouring countries. Not only 
does Syria have a distinct culture, lifestyle, and customs, but 
the war in Syria—and the displacement and dispossession 
that followed—has created unforeseen social practices that 
affect the lives of those trying to settle in Turkey. Syrian refu-
gee women increasingly find themselves far outnumbering 
men, as they have gone to join rebel groups, have been killed 
or captured in combat, or migrated outside of the country 
separately. In addition, a large proportion of young men 
have fled the country, fearing the regime’s expanding policy 
of conscription. As such, Syrian women are under increasing 
economic and social pressure to secure their future.
Considering the realities facing Syrian migrant and refu-
gee women, lack of birth control and abortion services is at 
risk of leading to high fertility rates, early marriage, and rein-
forcing the perception of women as the backbone of house-
hold and family. As such, there has been limited success for 
the participation of Syrian women in education and train-
ing programs. Girls aged between eleven and seventeen are 
particularly vulnerable. Needless to say, the leadership of 
Syrian women, many of whom are heads of households or 
in polygamous marriages, will help strengthen the economic 
and social participation of the Syrian population in Turkey.51 
To put the situation of Syrian women in perspective, it is 
important to note that only one in five women are in paid 
employment in Turkey. Overall, the female labour force par-
ticipation rate stagnated at around 30 per cent, well below 
the average for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development for the last thirty years, despite rapid 
urbanization and massive social transformation.52 In the 
case of Syrian refugee women, language issues and gender-
based discrimination further complicate matters, so very few 
women refugees find work other than in poorly paid paid 
cleaning, housekeeping, or childcare duties, which are out-
side the formal economy. This combination increases Syrian 
women’s economic dependency and precarity. Women who 
migrate with their children face further barriers, as they can-
not combine childcare and employment when access to edu-
cation for Syrian children is limited or missing, especially 
during the earlier phases of the exodus.53 This is the context 
in which we can anticipate early marriage of girls emerging 
as a survival strategy. However, since marriages under the 
age of eighteen are not recognized in Turkey, early marriage 
risks leading to further vulnerabilities for Syrian women. 
“Early marriages” could be understood as a form human traf-
ficking. Especially in the border provinces, young girls and 
women are persuaded to come to Turkey with the promise 
of a better life only to be forced to either marry a Turkish or 
Syrian man in a religious ceremony to become their unlaw-
ful second wives, or forced into prostitution.
Under the state of emergency rules that have curtailed 
public life in Turkey since August 2017, strict security regu-
lations restrict NGOs responses to refugees and adversely 
affect services for survivors of gender-based violence. The 
humanitarian groups in Turkey have focused primarily on 
emergency response and immediate needs for survival. At 
this stage Syrians are no longer guests, and the majority of 
them intend to settle in Turkey permanently. An integration 
phase orchestrated by public authorities, including language 
courses, job training, familiarity with public services includ-
ing educational institutions, and skills-training could facili-
tate integration of female Syrian refugees into Turkish society. 
However, most of these services are either absent or are uti-
lized by Syrian men instead in the predominantly patriarchal 
Syrian and Turkish societies. A gender-responsive plan to 
integrate female refugees into the social and political life of 
Turkish society would be the first step in that direction. An 
educational strategy that offers self-reliance and education 
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for female refugees to support themselves and their families 
is sorely needed. However, given the larger Turkish context, 
such a strategy is also needed for Turkish women who are 
not refugees but natives to the land. Similarly, ensuring that 
all Syrian children are in school is one of the most effective 
ways to stop child marriage, but again, the same stipulation 
applies to Turkish girls who are forced into early marriages. 
Expanding multi-sectoral service centres and promot-
ing gender sensitivity within the existing humanitarian 
response to the Syrian crisis is of utmost importance. Given 
that the lives and social networks of most refugees have 
been destroyed and that women make up the majority of 
displaced Syrians, female refugees play a crucial role in over-
coming the challenges refugee communities face for years to 
come. The resilience of female refugees should be matched 
with opportunities for them to create sustainable and safe 
communities for their families in Turkey. The problem is 
that working-class, marginalized urban migrant and rural 
women in Turkey also face very similar challenges, and the 
majority of Syrian refugees share their living spaces and 
life worlds with the underclasses of Turkey who have very 
similar needs and also suffer from very similar dynamics of 
gender-segregation themselves. 
Conclusion
Forced labour is not a static or singular situation but is 
experienced in diverse ways and through complex entry 
points.54 Using the International Labour Organization defi-
nition, forced labour is becoming increasingly prevalent in 
the context of forced migration across the Middle East, the 
example of Syrian women being one amongst many. Since 
fieldwork amongst refugee and displaced populations has 
been restricted, so there has been little research into the expe-
riences of asylum seekers and refugees in this regard. In this 
article I argued that severe labour exploitation among migrant 
groups and sans-papiers is to be understood within the wider 
framework of lack of freedom of movement, precarious live-
lihoods, and undetermined or semi-legitimate socio-legal 
status. Employers and traffickers often deliberately use these 
vulnerabilities to impose to extreme working conditions 
upon forced migrants that would not otherwise be possible. 
In this regard, precarious immigration status such as being 
undocumented, or being a refused asylum seeker foregrounds 
insecurity, exploitation, and trafficking. A close examination 
of Syrian women’s experiences also revealed that the range 
of coercive and abusive practices affecting displaced popula-
tions have a marked gender aspect. As employers or recruiters 
exploit the lack of socio-legal status to impose substandard 
working conditions on workers, particularly those working 
without permission, the situation also leads to the emergence 
of new forms of bondage such as human trafficking of young 
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